Reprinted  from  The  American  Political  Science  Review 
Vol.  XVI,  No.  3,  August,  1922 


STATE  ADMINISTRATIVE  REORGANIZATION 

JOHN  M.  MATHEWS 
University  of  Illinois 

Writing  in  1919,  Mr.  W.  F.  Willoughby  declared  that  “at  the 
present  time  few  reforms  of  government  in  the  United  States 
are  more  urgent  than  that  of  the  reorganization  of  the  adminis- 
trative services  of  our  state  governments,  so  as  to  put  them  upon 
the  integrated  or  departmental  basis.  This  need  for  state 
administrative  reorganization  is  now  generally  recognized,  not 
only  by  political  scientists  and  students  of  administration,  but 
also  by  public  officials  and  practical  administrators.  This  is 
indicated  by  the  large  number  of  governors  who,  in  public  mes- 
sages, have  urged  upon  their  legislatures  the  adoption  of  measures 
of  administrative  reform;  by  the  investigations  and  reports  of 
efficiency  and  economy  commissions  or  similar  bodies  created 
in  many  states;  and  by  the  laws  actually  passed  providing  for 
administrative  reorganization  in  Illinois,  Idaho,  Nebraska,  Ohio 
Washington,  Massachusetts,  and  other  states. 

A movement  of  this  character  naturally  follows  the  line  of 
least  resistance,  and  consequently  the  changes  in  administrative 
organization  heretofore  made  have  been  through  statutory  enact- 
ment rather  than  through  constitutional  revision.  Inasmuch 
as,  in  most  states,  a faulty  organization  of  the  administration  is 
stereotyped  in  the  constitution,  thoroughgoing  reorganization  by 
mere  statutory  enactment  is  practically  im-  ossible.  The  con- 
stitutional difficulties  which  impede  the  movement  for  adminis- 
trative reorganization  should  warn  us  against  the  insertion  in  the 
organic  law  of  detailed  administrative  provisions.  The  intro- 
duction of  the  short  ballot  and  the  equalization  of  the  terms  of 
office  of  the  governor  and  other  state  officers  are  reforms  which 

1 The  Government  of  Modern  States,  p.  393. 

387 


388 


THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


are  impeded  by  constitutional  restrictions.  The  changes  in  the 
constitution  which  are  desirable  in  order  to  provide  for  needed 
flexibility  are  more  in  the  nature  of  elimination  of  existing  pro- 
visions than  of  the  addition  of  others.  The  Massachusetts  con- 
stitutional amendment  of  1918  providing  for  the  establishment 
by  law  of  not  more  than  twenty  administrative  departments 
represents,  in  principle,  the  extent  to  which  it  seems  desirable  to 
go  in  adopting  positive  constitutional  provisions  regarding  the 
administrative  organization. 

In  considering  the  fundamental  improvement  in  the  position 
of  the  executive  department  as  a whole,  two  main  questions 
arise:  first,  what  shall  be  the  relation  of  the  executive  to  the 
legislature;  and,  secondly,  what  provision  shall  be  made  in  re- 
spect to  the  internal  organization  of  the  executive  and  adminis- 
trative authorities?  With  reference  to  the  first  question,  two 
radically  different  views  are  held.  According  to  one  view,  the 
principle  of  separation  of  powers  must  be  altogether  adandoned, 
and  it  is  proposed  that  this  change  be  brought  about  by  making 
the  legislature  the  central  controlling  body  in  the  state  govern- 
ment and  giving  it  power  to  appoint  and  remove  the  governor. 
Those  who  hold  this  view  favor  a close  approach  to  the  parliamen- 
tary form  of  government  in  the  states.  They  also  hold  that  the 
commission  form  or,  better  still,  the  commission-manager  form 
of  city  government  should  serve  as  models  for  the  reorganization 
of  state  government. 

With  reference  to  this  proposal,  it  may  be  noted  that  in  the 
early  governments  of  the  original  states,  the  governor  was  made 
subordinate  to  the  legislature,  being  appointed  by  that  body  in 
several  of  them;  but  the  tendency  since  then  has  been  in  the  di- 
rection of  increasing  the  independence  of  the  governor  from 
legislative  control,  especially  with  reference  to  his  political  powers. 
Any  plan  for  the  reorganization  of  the  state  governments,  in 
order  to  be  successful,  should  be  in  harmony  with  the  general 
trend  of  their  organic  development. 

Although  there  was  formerly  some  agitation  in  favor  of  the 
application  of  the  commission  form  of  city  government  to  the 
states,  this  proposal  is  not  now  seriously  made.  It  is  very 


35  3 
yj  tfSs 

cap,  1 7 


STATE  ADMINISTRATIVE  REORGANIZATION  389 

doubtful  whether  it  would  be  expedient  to  apply  to  the  state 
governments  without  modification  the  main  feature  of  commis- 
sion government, — the  merging  of  executive  and  legislative 
powers  in  the  hands  of  the  same  body.  Although  the  principle 
of  separation  of  powers  has  undoubtedly  been  carried  much  too 
far  in  its  application  to  the  state  governments,  it  does  not  seem 
wise  to  go  to  the  other  extreme  of  abandoning  it  almost  altogether 
by  entirely  merging  the  political  departments  of  such  govern- 
ments, or  bringing  them  into  such  close  relation  as  almost  en- 
tirely to  lose  their  separate  identities.  Although  the  governor 
is  an  important  political  officer,  he  should  also  be  recognized  as 
holding  a distinct  and  independent  position  as  head  of  the 
administration  in  a much  more  conspicuous  way  than  is  provided 
for  under  the  commission  form  of  city  government. 

On  the  other  hand,  equal  recognition  should  be  given  to  the 
position  of  the  governor  as  a political  leader  in  the  matter  of 
legislation  and  the  formulation  of  public  policies.  In  other 
words,  the  governor  ought  to  be  in  politics,  in  the  best  sense  of 
that  word.  For  this  reason,  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  com- 
mission-manager form  of  city  government  is  suitable  for  adoption 
without  modification  by  the  states.  The  city  manager  is  an 
administrative  expert,  subject  to  the  control  of  the  commission, 
and  is  not  supposed  to  be  in  politics.  The  governor  cannot  be 
expected  to  assume  a position  of  outstanding  political  leadership 
and  to  promote  his  policies  even,  if  necessary,  in  opposition  to  a 
majority  of  the  legislature,  if  subject  to  appointment  and  removal 
by  that  body.  The  manager  plan,  if  adopted  by  the  states, 
would  probably  tend  to  reduce  the  governor  to  the  position  of  a 
mere  administrative  chief.2 

Although  it  seems  desirable  that  the  principle  of  separation  of 
powers  should  not  be  altogether  adandoned  in  state  government, 
the  executive  and  legislative  departments  should  be  brought 
into  closer  contact  and  cooperation  than  now  exists  between 
them.  This  is  necessary  in  order  that  the  political  leadership 

2 It  might  be  desirable,  however,  in  some  states  to  authorize  the  governor  to 
appoint  a state  business  manager  to  attend  to  matters  of  general  administration, 
such  as  the  purchase  of  supplies  for  the  operating  departments  and  institutions! 


390 


THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


of  the  governor  may  be  effective.  To  this  end  a constitutional 
provision  should  be  adopted  giving  the  governor  a seat  in  the 
legislature,  with  the  privilege  of  introducing  bills  and  participat- 
ing in  debate,  but  without  that  of  voting.  The  heads  of  execu- 
tive departments  should  also  be  accorded  legislative  seats  with 
similar  privileges,  although  they  would  not  be  responsible  to  the 
legislature,  but  to  the  governor.  This  would  enable  the  execu- 
tive to  assume  openly  a position  of  leadership  in  advocating 
administration  measures  on  the  floor,  and  would  also  enable  the 
legislature  to  criticize  more  intelligently  the  results  of  adminis- 
trative action. 

A rule  similar  to  that  adopted  by  the  Illinois  house  of  repre- 
sentatives in  1913  should  be  established,  giving  precedence  to 
bills  designated  by  the  governor  as  administration  measures. 
That  rule  was  defective  in  excepting  from  such  prior  considera- 
tion appropriation  bills.  Bills  relating  to  state  finance  are  those 
which  it  is  especially  desirable  that  the  governor  should  take  the 
initiative  in  introducing  and  to  which  the  legislature  should  be 
required  to  give  prior  consideration.  Much  the  larger  share 
of  the  expenditures  of  the  state  governments  is  made  by  the 
executive  and  administrative  authorities;  but,  even  if  this  were 
not  true,  it  seems  proper  that  the  governor,  in  his  role  as  political 
leader,  should  take  the  initiative  in  formulating  the  budget  and 
in  introducing  the  budget  bill.  Whoever  prepares  the  budget 
is  likely  also  to  exert  an  influence  upon  the  plan  of  state  activities 
or  work-program.  In  planning  this  work  and  in  drawing  up  the 
budget  the  governor  should  have  the  assistance  of  a staff  agency 
directly  under  him,  which  should  conduct  continuous  surveys 
and  investigations  of  the  work  of  the  various  agencies  engaged 
in  the  performance  of  service  functions,  in  order  to  collect  the 
information  upon  which  to  base  a critical  examination  and  re- 
vision of  the  budget  estimates. 

The  legislature  should  still  retain  its  power  of  rejecting  or 
modifying  the  governor’s  budget.  Since  the  governor  retains 
his  item-veto  (which  should  be  expanded  so  as  to  include  the 
power  of  reducing  items),  it  seems  unnecessary  to  prohibit  the 
legislature  by  constitutional  provision  from  increasing  the 


STATE  ADMINISTRATIVE  REORGANIZATION 


391 


governor’s  estimates,  though  its  power  to  do  so  might  be  re- 
stricted by  requiring  an  extraordinary  majority  for  this  purpose. 
In  case  of  decided  and  continuous  difference  of  opinion  between 
the  legislature  and  the  governor  over  important  parts  of  his 
budget  bill,  provision  might  be  made  for  settling  the  question  by 
popular  referendum.3 

The  matter  of  a proper  budget  system  for  the  state  is  closely 
associated  with  that  of  the  reorganization  of  the  state  administra- 
tion into  a more  coherent  and  integrated  system.  The  scattered 
and  decentralized  condition  of  the  administrative  agencies  found 
in  most  states  renders  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  formulate 
and  carry  out  a scientific  budget  plan.4  If  the  purpose  of  the 
executive  budget  system  is  to  be  accomplished,  it  is  necessary 
first  to  effect  such  a reorganization  as  will  make  the  governor  the 
real,  instead  of  the  mere  nominal  head  of  the  administration. 

This  brings  us  to  the  consideration  of  the  second  main  phase 
of  the  general  subject,  namely,  internal  reorganization,  or  the 
readjustment  of  the  relations  between  the  different  executive 
and  administrative  agencies  in  the  interests  of  great  unity, 
responsibility,  concentration  of  authority  and  efficiency  in  action. 
One  of  the  main  obstacles  to  effective  administrative  organiza- 
tion in  most  states,  which,  on  account  of  its  constitutional  basis, 
is  difficult  to  change,  is  the  election  of  the  heads  of  executive 
departments  by  popular  vote.  Considerations  of  party  cohesion 
may  produce  some  degree  of  harmony  between  these  officers  and 
the  governor,  inasmuch  as  they  are  all,  as  a rule,  elected  on  the 
same  party  ticket.  But  it  sometimes  happens  that  they  belong 
to  a different  party  from  that  of  the  governor,  or  a different 
faction  of  the  same  party,  and  frequently  the  governor  is  able  to 
exert  little  or  no  real  control  over  them.  The  practice  of  electing 
the  heads  of  departments  exerts  a subtle  influence  in  dividing  the 
administration,  developing  friction  and  causing  a lack  of  harmony 
and  cooperation  with  the  governor  and  between  the  various 
departments.  It  also  causes  the  injection  of  political  considera- 

3 Cf.  the  Model  State  Constitution  presented  by  the  Committee  on  State 
Government  of  the  National  Municipal  League,  sect.  27. 

4 J.  M.  Mathews,  Report  of  the  Consolidation  Commission  of  Oregon  (1918),  p.  16. 


392 


THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


tions  and  ambitions  into  the  management  of  elective  offices  which 
are  not  conducive  to  efficiency  and  cooperative  action. 

It  is  generally  agreed  that  the  short  ballot  should  be  adopted 
as  one  of  the  main  features  of  a reorganized  state  administrative 
system,  not  primarily  for  the  purpose  of  lessening  the  burden  upon 
the  voter,  but  mainly  for  the  purpos-e  of  integrating  the  adminis- 
tration and  concentrating  responsibility.  There  is  some  question 
however,  as  to  how  short  the  ballot  should  be  made.  Probably 
the  best  plan  would  seem  to  be  to  elect  only  one  other  officer 
of  the  executive  department  besides  the  governor,  either  the 
lieutenant-governor  or  the  auditor.  The  office  of  lieutenant- 
governor  should  either  be  abolished  or  else  reconstructed  into  a 
position  of  greater  worth  and  usefulness.  He  might  be  made 
a sort  of  deputy  governor  and  relieve  the  governor  of  many  of 
the  routine  duties  which  now  distract  his  attention  from  more 
important  matters.  In  case  the  office  of  lieutenant-governor  is 
abolished,  then  the  auditor  should  be  retained  on  the  elective 
list  for  two  reasons.  The  first  is  in  order  to  give  him  a position 
somewhat  independent  of  the  administration,  which  might  be 
emphasized  by  electing  him  at  a different  time  from  that  of  the 
gubernatorial  election.  The  second  reason  is  in  order  to  pro- 
vide an  officer  of  state-wide,  instead  of  local  election,  to  succeed 
to  the  governorship  in  case  of  vacancy  in  that  office.  In  case 
the  office  of  lieutenant-governor  is  not  abolished,  the  second  of 
these  reasons  for  electing  the  auditor  no  longer  operates,  and  it 
would  be  better  that  the  latter  be  appointed  by  the  legislature 
as  its  agent  in  keeping  a check  on  expenditures. 

The  introduction  of  the  short  ballot  would,  of  course,  result  in 
increasing  the  appointive  power  of  the  governor.  This  in  itself, 
however,  would  not  be  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  exercise  an 
effective  control  over  the  whole  administration  in  view  of  the 
large  number  and  the  scattered  and  disorganized  condition  of 
the  administrative  agencies  in  many  states.  It  is  necessary,  in 
addition,  to  effect  a consolidation  and  departmentalization  of  the 
administrative  services.  A reduction  in  the  number  of  separate 
agencies  is  necessary  for  effective  central  control  over  them,  as 
well  as  for  their  proper  interrelation  and  cooperation.  As  a 


STATE  ADMINISTRATIVE  REORGANIZATION 


393 


result  of  this  reduction  in  number  and  the  increase  of  central 
control,  the  heads  of  the  executive  departments  could  be  formed 
into  a body  of  advisors  or  governor’s  cabinet  for  formulating  the 
policies  and  planning  the  general  work-program  of  the  adminis- 
tration, upon  the  analogy  of  the  cabinet  officers  in  the  national 
government.  The  consolidation  of  related  agencies  would  tend 
to  simplify  the  administrative  organization  and  to  make  it  more 
responsive  to  the  governor  and,  through  him,  to  the  people. 

There  should  be  probably  not  more  than  a dozen  main  depart- 
ments into  which  all  the  administrative  agencies  should  be 
grouped.  One  reason  for  this  limitation  is  that  a larger  body 
of  department  heads  would  not  be  suitable  for  consultative  pur- 
poses in  cabinet  meetings.  A more  important  reason  is  that  a 
larger  number  of  separate  departments  tends  to  complicate  and 
decentralize  the  work  of  administration.  The  number  of  sepa- 
rate departments  should  be  as  small  as  feasible  consistent  with 
the  grouping  in  each  department  of  related  functions.  The 
consolidation  of  administrative  agencies  thus  involves  not  only 
the  creation  of  a few  major  departments  in  place  of  a large  num- 
ber of  small  ones,  but  also  the  grouping  of  related  services  within 
each  major  department.  The  exact  number  of  departments  and 
the  grouping  of  functions  under  departments  will  naturally  vary 
somewhat  from  state  to  state,  due  to  differences  in  local  condi- 
tions. Some  large  departments,  however,  such  as  those  of 
finance,  education,  and  public  health,  would  probably  be  suitable 
under  conditions  found  in  all  the  states. 

After  the  regrouping  of  the  scattered  administrative  agencies 
into  a few  major  departments  has  been  made,  it  still  remains 
to  be  determined  what  form  of  internal  organization  is  desirable 
for  these  departments.  Should  we  have  at  the  head  of  the 
department  a board,  a commission,  or  a single  commissioner? 
The  prevalence  of  boards  and  commissions  in  the  past  has  been 
one  of  the  main  causes  of  the  disintegration  of  the  administration 
and  the  diffusion  of  responsibility.  They  have  amply  demon- 
strated their  incapacity  for  administrative  work.  The  tendency 
in  reorganization  plans,  whether  proposed  or  in  operation,  has 
been  very  decidedly  away  from  the  board  or  commission  and  in 


394 


THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


the  direction  of  the  single  commissioner.  It  is  recognized, 
however,  that  for  the  performance  of  advisory,  quasi-legislative, 
and  quasi-judicial  functions  several  heads  are  usually  better 
than  one,  and  in  these  cases,  therefore,  some  concession  may  be 
made  to  the  board  or  commission  type  of  organization.  Thus, 
in  Illinois,  all  of  the  nine  departments  created  by  the  Civil 
Administrative  Code  are  under  single  commissioners,  called 
directors;  but  provision  is  made  for  certain  commissions,  such  as 
the  tax  commission  and  the  industrial  commission,  which  are 
nominally  placed  in  the  appropriate  departments.  Provision 
is  also  made  for  certain  advisory  and  non-executive  boards  in 
some  of  the  departments.  The  Illinois  plan  is  faulty  on  account 
of  the  loose  and  ill-defined  relation  between  the  commissions  and 
the  departments  in  which  they  are  nominally  placed.  In  de- 
partments where  there  are  quasi-legislative  or  quasi-judicial 
functions  to  be  performed,  associate  directors  should  be  provided 
to  act  with  the  head  director  for  the  exercise  of  such  functions, 
but  the  head  director  should  be  solely  responsible  for  the  adminis- 
trative work. 

Another  question  which  arises  is  as  to  the  proper  method  of 
selecting  the  heads  of  departments  and  other  officers  of  the 
administration.  The  short  ballot  plan,  as  already  indicated, 
provides  that  the  governor  should  appoint  the  heads  of  the 
departments,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  auditor,  who, 
under  certain  circumstances,  may  be  retained  on  the  elective 
list.  A further  question  is  as  to  whether  the  governor’s  appoint- 
ments should  be  subject  to  confirmation  by  the  senate.  Such 
confirmation  is  unobjectionable  if  a tradition  exists  to  the  effect 
that  appointments  to  cabinet  positions  are  to  be  confirmed  as  a 
matter  of  course.  This  is  the  practice  in  the  case  of  presidential 
appointments  to  such  positions;  but  there  is  no  assurance  that 
state  senates  would  everywhere  take  the  same  attitude  toward 
the  governor’s  appointments,  especially  when  the  governor  and 
senate  are  out  of  political  harmony.  Where  a power  is  unob- 
jectionable only  when  it  is  not  used,  there  seems  to  be  no  good 
reason  for  conferring  it. 


STATE  ADMINISTRATIVE  REORGANIZATION 


395 


Efficiency  and  economy  commissions,  in  their  proposed  plans 
for  state  administrative  reorganization,  usually  recommend  that 
the  power  of  the  senate  to  confirm  appointments  be  retained. 
But  this  recommendation  is  probably  made  for  reasons  of  ex- 
pediency, since  the  proposed  plan  must  secure  the  approval  of 
the  senate  in  order  to  be  adopted.  Looking  at  the  matter  from 
a more  detached  point  of  view,  it  seems  better  to  dispense  al- 
together with  the  action  of  the  senate  in  this  matter,  so  as  to 
place  the  responsibility  for  appointments  squarely  on  the 
shoulders  of  the  governor  where  it  belongs,  rather  than  to  divide 
it  between  him  and  the  senate.  The  governor  may  need  advice 
before  making  appointments,  and  it  may  be  suggested  that  it 
would  be  sufficient  to  require  the  governor  to  secure  the  advice 
of  the  senate  but  not  to  follow  it.  But  no  provision  of  law  is 
needed  for  this  purpose,  and  it  may  be  presumed  that  when  the 
governor  needs  advice  in  making  appointments,  he  will  consult 
the  persons  capable  of  giving  it,  whether  in  or  out  of  the  senate. 
The  only  legal  check  that  seems  needful  in  the  matter  is  to  re- 
quire that  the  governor  issue  a public  statement  indicating  his 
reasons  for  making  the  appointment,  which  should  include  a 
description  of  the  appointee’s  qualifications  for  the  position. 
This  would  tend  to  prevent  wholly  unsuitable  appointments  and 
would  at  the  same  time  concentrate  responsibility  for  the  ap- 
pointment. 

Some  plans  of  administrative  reorganization  give  the  governor 
the  power  of  appointing  also  the  heads  of  bureaus  and  divisions 
within  the  major  departments.  But  this  is  a mistake  for  three 
reasons.  In  the  first  place,  it  affords  a plausible  excuse  for  re- 
quiring that  these  appointments  be  confirmed  by  the  senate, 
while  no  one  would  contend  that  this  should  be  required  if  the 
appointments  are  made  by  the  heads  of  the  executive  depart- 
ments. In  the  second  place,  it  burdens  the  governor  with  the 
importunities  of  large  numbers  of  office  seekers.  The  time  and 
attention  of  the  governor  should  not  be  distracted  with  matters 
of  petty  patronage,  but  should  be  free  for  the  consideration  of 
the  larger  problems  of  administration.  In  the  third  place,  it 
violates  the  principle  of  the  due  subordination  of  each  officer  to 


396 


THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


his  superior.  The  governor  ought  not  to  hold  the  heads  of 
departments  responsible  for  their  work  unless  they  are  given 
the  power  of  appointing  the  heads  of  the  divisions  and  bureaus 
within  their  departments,  although  they  may  consult  with  the 
governor  in  making  the  appointments.  The  proposal  to  reduce 
the  number  of  elective  officers  does  not  contemplate  that  the 
total  number  of  officers  to  be  appointed  by  the  governor  should 
be  increased,  but  rather  that,  instead  of  appointing  many  officers 
and  boards  of  relatively  minor  importance,  he  should  make  only 
a few,  but  much  more  important  appointments.5 

Although  the  general  scheme  of  administrative  organization 
should  be  provided  by  legislative  act,  provision  should  be  made 
for  enabling  the  governor  to  meet  emergencies  by  conferring  on 
him  the  power  to  redistribute  functions  among  administrative 
agencies  in  the  interest  of  economy  and  efficiency,  on  the  analogy 
of  the  power  conferred  on  the  President  by  the  Overman  Act. 
In  the  interests  of  efficiency  and  flexibility,  the  duties  and  func- 
tions of  the  administrative  officers  and  employees  should  be 
determined  to  a large  extent  by  executive  orders  and  regulations 
rather  than  by  the  detailed  provisions  of  legislative  acts.  The 
director  of  each  department  should  be  empowered  to  prescribe 
regulations,  not  inconsistent  with  law,  for  the  government  of 
his  department,  the  conduct  of  its  employees,  and  the  distribu- 
tion and  performance  of  its  business.  The  subordinate  officers 
and  employees,  under  the  heads  of  bureaus  and  divisions,  should 
not  be  subject  to  appointment  for  political  reasons.  They  should 
have  relatively  secure  tenure,  and  a proper  separation  of  politics 
from  administration  should  be  effected  by  providing  for  their 
appointment  and  removal  only  in  accordance  with  the  principles 
of  the  merit  system.  This  system  might  in  time  be  extended 
even  to  the  heads  of  bureaus  and  divisions  immediately  under 
the  cabinet  officers,  since  they  are  not  properly  policy-determin- 
ing officers,  but  it  is  their  duty  to  carry  out  the  policies  of  their 
superiors. 

It  does  not  seem  necessary  that  heads  of  departments  should 
be  appointed  for  definite  terms  of  office.  They  should  serve  at 

6 J.  M.  Mathews,  Report  of  the  Consolidation  Commission  of  Oregon  (1918),  p.  10. 


STATE  ADMINISTRATIVE  REORGANIZATION 


397 


the  pleasure  of  the  governor,  subject  to  removal  by  him  at  any 
time.  This  is  merely  carrying  out  the  plan  of  the  national 
government,  and  has  long  been  the  law  in  Pennsylvania  with 
reference  to  the  attorney-general  and  the  secretary  of  the  com- 
monwealth. It  seems  desirable,  however,  to  provide  against 
any  arbitrary  exercise  of  the  removal  power  by  requiring  that, 
as  in  the  case  of  appointments,  the  governor  shall  issue  a public 
statement  of  the  reasons  for  removal.  Just  as  the  governor  is 
required  to  state  his  objections  in  vetoing  a bill,  so  he  should  be 
required  to  give  similar  publicity  to  his  reasons  for  appointments 
and  removals. 

Where  terms  of  office  of  any  members  of  the  administration 
are  specified,  they  should  not  be  longer  than  that  of  the  governor. 
The  terms  of  statutory  officers  have  tended  to  increase,  but  this 
tendency  has  not  been  so  great  in  the  case  of  the  governor  be- 
cause his  term  is  definitely  fixed  in  the  constitution.  It  should 
in  all  states  be  raised  to  at  least  four  years,  in  order  that  he  may 
have  adequate  opportunity  for  carrying  out  a constructive  pro- 
gram. Moreover,  his  inauguration  should  take  place  about  two 
months  before  the  first  regular  legislative  session  in  his  term  in 
order  to  give  him  a better  chance  than  he  now  has  of  maturing 
his  budget  plans  and  other  features  of  his  legislative  policy  be- 
fore the  session  begins. 

The  plan  of  reorganization  herein  proposed  makes  the  office 
of  governor  the  central  pivotal  point  about  which  the  whole 
administration  revolves.  It  may  be  objected  to  by  some  on 
the  ground  that  it  makes  the  governor  too  powerful.  This, 
however,  is  merely  applying  to  the  states  the  theory  of  the 
national  government,  in  which  the  President  is  the  real  head  of 
the  administration.  There  is  no  great  danger  in  conferring  on 
the  governor  increased  power  if  it  is  accompanied  with  commen- 
surate responsibility.  This  responsibility  will  be  enforced  in 
part  through  the  simplified  machinery  and  the  greater  publicity 
in  which  the  work  of  the  administration  will  be  conducted  under 
the  reorganized  system.  An  adequate  civil  service  system  on 
the  merit  basis,  extending  preferably  even  to  the  heads  of  bureaus 
and  divisions,  will  help  to  prevent  a governor,  if  perchance  so 


398 


THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW 


inclined,  from  using  his  power  to  build  up  a political  machine. 
A permanency  of  tenure  on  the  part  of  the  heads  of  bureaus  and 
divisions  immediately  under  the  heads  of  departments  will  go 
far  toward  maintaining  efficiency  in  administration  in  spite  of 
the  unavoidable  frequency  of  change  in  the  personnel  of  depart- 
ment heads.  A legislative  council  might  be  created  to  sit  be- 
tween regular  legislative  sessions  and  to  act  as  a continuous  critic 
of  the  administration.  In  order  to  increase  the  governor’s  re- 
sponsibility directly  to  the  people,  provision  should  be  made 
for  his  recall  by  popular  vote,  subject  to  reasonable  restrictions. 
This  would  enable  the  people  to  pass  upon  the  governor’s  general 
policies  prior  to  the  end  of  his  term,  as  was  done  in  North  Dakota 
in  1921,  where  the  governor  was  recalled  for  the  first  time  in  any 
state.  If  the  popular  recall  is  introduced,  it  would  then  be 
feasible  to  have  the  governor  elected  for  even  longer  than  a four 
year  term,  subject  to  recall  at  stated  intervals  during  his  term. 
This  would  tend  to  attract  abler  men  to  the  office  and  give  them 
larger  powers  and  opportunities  of  leadership,  subject  to  ade- 
quate accountability  to  the  people  for  the  use  and  abuse  of  their 
powers  and  opportunities. 


